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Women have never gained a significant voice in corporate America, holding only 27% of 
the board seats on the S&P 500. Recently, an increasing number of Americans have grown to 
realize the inequity of this practice, resulting in a rise in female directors. However, this growth 
is slow and largely in need of a policy to speed up the process. Gender quotas have garnered the 
most attention, but political limitations make them largely unattainable in the United States. In 
order to assess viable alternatives, this thesis assembles a database on corporate practices and 
uses statistical models to predict what policies and suggestions will best suit the United States. 
The models indicate that a mix of policies which indirectly and incrementally increase gender 
parity will work best in the context of American politics. Although these policies are arguably 
less efficient than quotas, they are feasible alternatives that will help women attain a greater 
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Women are drastically underrepresented in positions of power and prominence in the 
United States, preventing the nation from achieving the equality it claims to provide. Despite 
making up over 50% of the United States population, women hold only 27% of board seats in the 
S&P 500.1 Measures to increase female representation have historically been viewed 
unfavorably, with critics claiming that it is “undemocratic” to force gender equity through policy 
initiatives. However, this view is slowly dissipating as people are realizing that the existing 
underrepresentation of a large section of the population is un-democratic. Most Americans 
indicate support for increasing female representation; a study by the Pew Research Center found 
that 59% of Americans think that there are too few women in top executive business positions 
(Horowitz, 2018). Public opinion is, therefore, increasingly supportive of gender equity 
initiatives, likely fueled in part by the 2017 Me Too Movement. Businesses have likewise 
become more receptive to gender equity, though this is arguably fueled by potential profit rather 
than democratic notions of fairness. Regardless of the reasons, gender equity on corporate boards 
is gaining more traction, but actual progress is slow and largely in need of the help of a policy.  
Policy initiatives to increase gender equity traditionally focus on corporate quotas. By 
requiring companies to have a certain percentage of women on their boards, quotas are arguably 
the most effective and efficient policy solution. However, quotas directly clash with the 
American ideal of a limited government, making quotas largely unlikely as a policy solution for 
most of America. Instead, policies that indirectly and incrementally increase gender equity are 
 
1 “Board member” and “director” are synonymous terms and I will use them interchangeably in this thesis.  
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better suited for American government, as well as policy suggestions that are not necessarily 
mandates.  
Although gender equity is a broad academic field with many research programs, there are 
only a few studies that discuss viable alternatives for quotas. Analyzing corporate practices and 
policies is therefore crucial in order to understand what policy solutions will most effectively 
increase gender equity on corporate boards. Current data on corporations is surprisingly lacking, 
resulting in the motivation for this thesis. I have compiled a database with a random sample of 
corporations in the S&P 500 and tracked variables I thought may influence gender parity. The 
database and the accompanying statistical models provide insight into corporate practices and 
allow me to draw relevant inferences from these findings.  Using these findings, I am able offer 
policy suggestions and corporate solutions that are uniquely suited to increase gender parity 
within the context of American politics.  
In Chapter 1, the rationale for gender equity is discussed in relation to both corporations 
and workers. Several studies indicate that gender diversity has tangible benefits, indicating that 
diversity has relevancy beyond that of democratic notions of fairness. These benefits are then 
compared to legislative diversity efforts given that there is a more robust literature on the topic. 
Finally, the necessity for policy intervention is discussed. Gender diversity efforts have become 
politically favorable but are extremely slow, indicating that new policies are needed to drive 
faster change.  
Chapter 2 is an analysis of gender quotas. Quotas are the primary policy solution 
discussed in both the domestic and international literature on gender parity. Several countries 
have passed corporate quotas within the last few years, though they are considerably less 
widespread than legislative quotas. California is the first and only state to pass quotas in the 
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United States. Although quotas are mostly effective, they are considered to be politically 
infeasible for most of America. Quotas interfere with the American ideal of a free market, 
rendering them improbable within the context of American politics.  
Chapter 3 details the compilation of a unique database. The S&P 500 is chosen as the 
data source because it is a popular index of large, public corporations within the United States. 
100 companies were randomly selected from the list and data was compiled in January 2020. The 
database includes variables that are thought to impact the gender equity of boards, such as 
parental leave and term limits. These variables are then analyzed to find basic statistical 
relationships.  
In Chapter 4, I build several regression models in an effort to test the data. This helps 
clarify the relationships found in the previous chapter and gives an indication of statistical 
significance. Three models are presented, each utilizing a different dependent variable. In Model 
1, the dependent variable is the percentage of female directors. Policies meant to purposely 
increase gender diversity, such as mandatory retirement policies and board diversity statements, 
are not effective. However, the longevity of female directors, the number of female executives, 
and the type of industry all significantly impact the likelihood of women serving on a board. In 
Models 2 and 3, the dependent variables are parental leave and parent friendly policies, 
respectively. However, these models appear to largely lack statistical significance, likely due to 
limitations in the data.  
I utilize the findings from earlier chapters to propose a series of viable policy solutions in 
Chapter 5. The government should implement parental leave, a Rooney Rule, and subsidize 
programs for females to pursue male-dominated industries. These policies are becoming 
increasingly popular in the United States and will have an easier time passing than quotas. 
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However, these policies are less efficient than quotas, meaning that they will increase gender 
parity at a slower rate. To compensate for a slower change, corporations can also implement 
private policies. Company initiated gender quotas are encouraged as well as mentoring programs 
and term limits. These policies are too restrictive to be passed as a government mandate but are 
nevertheless effective ways to increase female directors. Non-traditional policy avenues, such as 
tax incentives, are also a viable alternative.  
Achieving gender parity on boards is therefore a valuable goal but burdened by 
seemingly complex solutions. There is not a single policy that both efficiently solves the problem 
and is considered politically feasible. However, instituting a mix of policies will encourage 
boards to add female directors at a faster rate. Women have been underrepresented on boards for 
far too long. This thesis aims to give policymakers and corporations policy suggestions that they 















Rationale for Gender Equity  
Gender equity has increasingly become a salient issue to most Americans. 54% of 
Americans think that gender discrimination is a major reason why there are not more women in 
top executive business positions (Horowitz, 2018). This increasing support has resulted in an 
influx in the number of studies conducted on the topic and has convinced many Americans that 
women deserve representation in corporate America. Numerous studies focus on the benefits of 
gender equity on corporations, such as improved firm performance (The Bottom Line, 2004; Lee, 
2015; Gul, 2011), lower cost acquisitions (Levi, 2014), fewer controversies (Lee, 2015), and 
increased support for women in leadership (Elsesser, 2011). Other studies focus more on the 
benefits that workers derive, such as more receptive policies aimed at workers’ needs (Bernardi, 
2006) and a mentoring effect on other women (Kurtulus, 2011; Terjesen, 2009). This chapter 
will show that when these studies are considered all together, they indicate that gender equitable 
boards are largely advantageous for both corporations and workers.  
The gender diversity of legislatures is frequently studied and provides a comparison for 
corporations. Female politicians are found to have different policy aims than men, indicating a 
diversity of ideas when there are more women in government. Women on corporate boards are 
likely to act in a similar way and diversify corporate interests. Lastly, this chapter concludes with 
the justification for policy intervention. Although the public is increasingly supportive of female 
directors, progress is extremely slow. The government must directly interfere to ensure that 




Gender Diversity and Corporations 
There is currently no federal law mandating gender diversity on corporate boards.2 
Corporations have the sole responsibility of reducing the gender disparity. Support from 
corporations is therefore crucial since nothing currently prevents boards from entirely excluding 
women. Therefore, it is critical to understand the impact of gender diversity on corporations, as 
this can influence how corporations approach gender diversity. This section details the impact of 
gender diversity on corporations and concludes that most of the effects are beneficial, thereby 
providing a strong incentive for corporations to add more women to their boards. 
Profit is arguably the most important consideration in swaying the decisions of firms. 
Numerous studies have analyzed the impact of women on firm performance and found a positive 
benefit (The Bottom Line, 2004; Lee, 2015; Gul, 2011). Evidence shows that companies with 
more female representation on top management teams experience better financial performance 
than companies with the lowest female representation. For instance, return on equity- which is a 
measure of the profitability of a business in relation to equity- is higher on average for 
companies with more female board members. One study finds that return on equity is 35.1% 
higher for boards with more females and that the total return to shareholders is 34% higher (The 
Bottom Line, 2004). A different study estimates that companies with strong female leadership 
generate a return on equity of 10.1% per year versus 7.4% for those without strong female 
leadership (Lee, 2015). These estimates do differ, likely as a result of a difference in their 
research design. Nonetheless, they are still in an overall agreement that greater gender diversity 
 
2 As of 2020, California is the only state to have passed a state corporate quota.  
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correlates to better financial outcomes, therefore corroborating the idea that gender has a positive 
financial impact.  
Another assessment of firm performance is stock prices. One study identified a positive 
link between gender diversity on corporate boards and stock price informativeness (Gul, 2011). 
Stock price informativeness is the association between stock returns and change in earnings. 
Companies with a high informativeness level are more transparent and may entice more people 
to invest. The rationale offered in the study regarding gender diversity is that women on 
corporate boards are more likely to release voluntary public disclosures. Gul (2011) argues that 
more public disclosures are associated with higher stock price informativeness, indicating a 
positive link between gender equity and firm performance. However, Gul also finds that gender 
diversity is shown to correlate with idiosyncratic volatility, which is essentially investment risk. 
This finding potentially undermines the positive impacts of having more women on a board. 
However, this study is the only major study to examine gender equity and stock prices, meaning 
that it is too soon to conclude anything either way.   
Although increasing profit is arguably the biggest incentive to corporations, there are 
numerous other non-monetary benefits. For instance, corporations that lack board gender 
diversity are more likely to suffer governance-related controversies, such as bribery, corruption, 
and fraud (Lee, 2015). Specifically, companies with gender diversity in the bottom quartile 
suffered 24% more governance-related controversies between 2012 and 2015. Another benefit of 
gender equity is the impact of gender on acquisition costs. Studies show that the presence of 
female directors on corporate boards is negatively associated with the firm’s acquisitiveness, 
meaning that firms pays less money to acquire assets (Levi, 2015). Women are apparently less 
motivated by empire building and make more cautious decisions, thereby making women less 
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likely to destroy shareholder value (Levi, 2015). The tendency of men to be overconfident is 
therefore a liability, thus making women more valuable for corporate boards.  
Another benefit to female directors is linked to the improvement in gender bias in the 
workplace. Historically, female bosses were viewed negatively, which caused difficulties for 
women trying to advance in their careers. However, in a nationwide survey conducted in 2011, 
scholars found that 54% of people do not have a gender bias towards their boss (Elsesser, 2011). 
While this indicates that many people still have a gender bias, this statistic represents an 
improvement from prior years and is part of a decades-long upward trend for women. 
Furthermore, Elsesser found evidence that exposure to female bosses is a big driving force in 
reducing this bias. This potentially indicates that as corporations have more women on their 
boards, the bias against them will decrease. 
Female board members are also more likely to see the importance of social issues and to 
support the Me Too movement (PwC Study, 2019). This support is critical and influential, as 
having a more gender-diverse board can improve a company’s image and legitimacy (Smith, 
2018). As evidenced by the results of the 2018 midterms, women’s rights are increasingly 
becoming more salient to the American public. Having an all-male board frankly looks bad in the 
current political climate, garnering support for policies that increase female representation.  
Gender Diversity and Workers 
In addition to corporate benefits, there are numerous advantages of gender diverse boards 
that help workers. For instance, boards with more female representation are more receptive to 
workers’ needs (Bernardi, 2006). Other studies have found that female leaders serve as mentors 
for other women within the corporation, inspiring these women to take on leadership positions 
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(Kurtulus, 2011; Terjesen, 2009; Wang, 2013). These benefits, although less salient to 
corporations, have a potentially strong influence on the American public and are detailed in this 
section.  
A study by Bernardi (2006) examined Fortune’s “100 Best Companies to Work For” list 
and found a link between the degree of women on boards and the firm’s receptiveness to worker 
needs. Essentially, firms with a higher representation of women have an “increased commitment 
[to] a quality [work] environment”, thus earning the characteristics necessary to establish a spot 
on Fortune’s list. Employee perceptions are therefore more positive at companies with more 
female board members. As such, the increased presence of women on corporate boards is 
correlated to a higher likelihood of guaranteeing a spot on the list. Bernardi speculates that this is 
because female board members care more about social responsibility, notably family-oriented 
benefits such as day-care assistance and flexible scheduling. This indicates that all workers 
derive more benefits when more women are on corporate boards.  
Existing literature also indicates that female board members serve as role models and 
mentors for other women in the corporation (Kurtulus, 2011; Terjesen, 2009; Wang, 2013). 
Female leaders are shown to have a positive influence on expanding the representation of women 
in lower-level positions within the firm (Kurtulus, 2011; Wang, 2013). One study found that the 
number of women on corporate boards is positively linked to the number of women in other 
leadership positions within the company. This is because low-level women feel “inspired” by the 
“huge milestones” taken by the female directors (Terjesen, 2009). Women on boards often 
network with other women within the corporation and typically serve as speakers for firm events, 
giving lower-level women the opportunity to form role models of their own gender. This enables 
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these women to believe that their own success is possible, as they look to the success already 
achieved by the women on the board (Terjesen, 2009).  
Legislative Comparison  
Some benefits to having women in leadership are more evident when examining 
legislative rather than corporate literature. This is largely because gender politics has historically 
received more attention than the gender composition of corporate boards. While legislative seats 
differ from board seats, ultimately, they are both leadership positions. Research indicates that 
female politicians impact the priorities and policies of legislatures.  
 Female politicians are shown to focus on different priorities than men. A recent study on 
this found that women are more likely to increase spending on health care and less likely to 
increase spending on military defense (Clayton, 2018). Increased female representation can 
therefore influence policy to become more “feminized”, shifting the focus away from historically 
masculine policy aims (Clayton, 2018). This allows for political priorities to change to areas 
favored by “historically marginalized groups” (Clayton, 2018). It is not unlikely then that having 
more women on corporate boards will similarly result in a shift in the type of decisions made by 
boards. Diversity of opinions is shown to correlate to better firm performance, indicating that 
new opinions are favorable for corporations (Clayton, 2018).  
Numerous studies indicate that women in government are also more likely to pay 
increased attention towards policies that promote women’s rights (Miller, 2016). Women are 
more likely to support and advocate for policies such as paid family leave and state subsidized 
child-care. These policies directly benefit working mothers and help lessen the burden that 
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children often have on women’s careers. It is likely that women on corporate boards will also 
advocate for similar policies, thus helping women advance in their careers. 
Justification for Policy Intervention 
Only a few companies have reached gender parity on their boards, despite the numerous 
economic and political benefits linked to gender diversity. Progress is slow at best, making it 
clear that legislative action is needed. Numerous studies show that without any policy 
intervention, it will still take years to achieve gender equity, despite a positive shift in American 
culture towards gender equity initiatives (Lee, 2015; Alliance for Board Diversity, 2018; Meyer, 
2010). However, this shift in culture – while seemingly beneficial to women – has made some 
board directors start to resent board diversity initiatives (PWC Study, 2019). Policy intervention 
is therefore crucial in order to achieve gender equity on boards and would show a much-needed 
commitment by the American government to reduce gender inequality (Franceschet, 2013).  
The argument that progress is slow may seem unconvincing given that numerous studies 
indicate that female representation is increasing (Alliance for Board Diversity, 2018; Lee, 2015). 
For instance, the Alliance for Board Diversity estimates that 15.7% of Fortune 500 boards were 
female in 2010 and that this number has grown to 22.5% in 2018 (Alliance for Board Diversity, 
2018). Furthermore, major companies, such as Facebook, have recently announced that they are 
making gender a priority for new board membership (Price, 2020). Goldman Sachs has taken it a 
step farther and recently announced that they will only help companies go public if they have at 
least one diverse board member. Goldman has indicated that their preference for diversity is 
women (Son, 2020). While these recent initiatives are encouraging, gender parity is still a slow 
endeavor. Furthermore, there is a worry that the increase in female directors is a result of a few 
women serving on more boards, rather than an actual increase in the number of new women 
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serving on overall boards. A study by MSCI estimates that women will not occupy 30% of board 
seats until 2027. This is over 10 years past the initial target set by the Thirty Percent Coalition, 
an initiative supported by major institutional investors within the United States to increase board 
representation (Lee, 2015). Without policy intervention, change may happen, but it is doubtful 
that it will happen anytime soon, nor is it a guarantee.  
There are numerous opponents to policies intended to increase female representation. 
Meyer (2010), a prominent scholar on policy theory, argues that change will happen irrespective 
of policy. In his opinion, it is the “the purposeful, directed, and autonomous behavior” of 
individuals that causes change “irrespective of state intervention” (Meyer, 2010, 1-20). A 
resistance to policy is surprisingly common in the United States, causing change to typically 
occur “almost entirely from private initiatives” (Terjesen 2009, 327). This is in direct contrast to 
Europe, in which change is “predominately driven by public policy” (Terjesen 2009, 327). 
Americans are therefore primed to oppose policies, especially if the policy is seen as an 
overreach of the government into the business sector.  
Although policies are opposed in America, they have been proven to successfully 
increase female representation in other countries. For instance, countries that invest more in 
state-funded childcare have more women on their boards (Grosvold, 2016). Furthermore, certain 
gender quotas have been shown to increase female board representation. As such, the state has 
the power to play a role in “facilitating market outcomes” that are in the “interest of women” 
(Grosvold 2016, 1184).  
The current opinions of corporate board members are a large reason that government 
intervention is a necessity. According to a study by PwC, while a large majority of board 
directors state that gender diversity brings unique perspectives (94%) and enhances board 
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performance (87%), these board members are also simultaneously becoming disillusioned by 
diversity mandates (PwC Study, 2019). In 2019, only 38% of board directors said that gender 
diversity is very important, a decrease from 2018 in which 46% of board directors agreed on the 
high importance of diversity. This is the first time in over five years that this question has had a 
decrease in support among board directors. Furthermore, 63% of directors say that investors 
“devote too much attention to board gender diversity”, which is a drastic increase from 2018 in 
which only 35% of directors felt this way (PwC Study 2019, 14). Board directors therefore seem 
to realize the benefits of gender diverse boards but are seemingly tired of the external pressure to 
increase it.  
The increasing disenchantment by board directors is mostly seen in men. Women overall 
still care about gender diversity initiatives. This is unsurprising given that the PwC Study found 
that most women (61%) thought that the optimal percentage of female directors was between 41-
50%, whereas only 41% of men felt the same way (PwC Study, 2019). Female directors are 
therefore more likely to support initiatives that decrease the gender disparity, such as policies 
that require interviewing female candidates or laws mandating board diversity. Men, however, 
are much more likely to think that boards will naturally become more diverse over time, with 
76% of men holding this view in comparison to only 33% of women (PwC Study, 2019). This 
further highlights the importance of policy intervention, as corporate board directors are mostly 
male and thus are less likely to value and implement gender diversity initiatives.  
Another reason that gender diversity initiatives are slow is due to a fear of change or a 
risk of failure. One study conducted on boards found that CEOs fear adding board members that 
are demographically diverse because they are more likely to challenge the CEO (Johnson et al., 
2017). CEOs also tend to hire board members that they already know, because they desire to 
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have a good relationship and to know exactly how the new board member will act. Given that 
most CEOs are men, the preference for a “safe” board member is almost always another man. 
Female directors are still atypical, and many CEOs appear to have a fear of the unknown. This 
fear drives the gender inequity of boards.  
Given the slow progress towards gender equitable boards, government intervention is 
needed to ensure faster and more reliable progress. By enacting polices that promote female 
representation on boards, the government is assuming the role of guarantors, rather than “mere 
promoters” of equality (Franceschet, 2013). Governments that enact policies are therefore 
showing their willingness to achieve equality and empower women. If left up to corporations to 
make these changes, it is predicted to take many years, during which women’s voices will 
continue to be underrepresented and drowned out by the overrepresentation of men. In the next 












 Gender Quotas 
While the necessity for policy intervention is evident, the right policy solution is much 
less certain. A substantial number of studies consider gender quotas. Gender quotas are praised 
for their efficiency and effectiveness, yet they are criticized for their artificial manipulation of 
diversity. Although California has implemented a quota, it is very unlikely for quotas to gain 
momentum in most of America. This chapter will discuss how quotas directly interfere with the 
American ideal of a free market, making them largely infeasible.  
History of Quotas 
 While different types of quotas exist, the basic premise involves increasing the number 
of women on corporate boards by mandating that a specific percentage must be female. The 
severity of penalties enacted for failing to comply and the percentage of female representation 
required vary across the countries that have enacted these quotas. Corporate quotas are a 
relatively new policy, with Norway enacting the first quota in 2003. Following Norway’s lead, 
Belgium, France, Germany, Iceland, India, Israel, Italy, Pakistan, and Spain have enacted their 
own form of corporate quotas.  
Corporate quotas are similar yet distinct from legislative quotas. Legislative quotas are 
considerably more popular as about half of the countries in the world have implemented some 
form of electoral quota. A diverse number of countries have implemented these quotas, ranging 
from Rwanda to Sweden. However, the United States is one of the few Western Democracies to 
have no legislative quota on either the federal or state level, resulting in the United States 
ranking at 100 out of 190 countries in female representation in 2017. Corporate quotas are much 
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rarer and newer than legislative quotas, making some people dismissive of them because of their 
novelty. Interestingly, California signed a corporate quota law into place in 2018, becoming the 
first and only state in the United States to do so. While a few other states have floated around a 
similar policy, not much progress has been made in any other state. Therefore, the success or 
failure of California’s law has the potential to greatly impact the future of corporate gender 
quotas within the United States. 
California’s Quota 
California’s quota requires publicly held corporations to have at least one female director 
by January 2020. By January 2022, the number of female directors is required to increase based 
on a sliding scale of the total number of directors. For instance, companies with six or more 
directors are required to have at least three female directors, while companies with five directors 
are required to have two. Companies that do not comply with the law are fined $100,000 for their 
first offense and $300,000 for repeat offenses (KPMG, 2020).  
Although California’s quota is new, it has already had modest effects. As of January 
2020, nearly all (96%) of the publicly held companies in California have complied with the quota 
by having at least one female director (KPMG, 2020). Additionally, 62% of the newly appointed 
women are serving on their first company board (KPMG, 2020). This signifies that the quota is 
not significantly contributing to the “over-boarding” problem that is characteristic of corporate 
America. “Over-boarding” is the tendency for America’s top corporations to select directors that 
already sit on several other corporate boards. This practice is problematic since it reduces the 
diversity and inclusiveness of corporate America. When companies overboard women, it means 
that they choose women already serving on another board. This means that a small number of 
women are serving on several boards, creating a false sense of gender equity. However, 
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California’s quota seems to have successfully increased the overall number of women serving on 
boards, thereby diversifying boards to a greater extent.  
Although California’s corporate quota law is new, several studies have analyzed the 
impacts of quotas in other countries. While many studies proclaim benefits of quotas (Smith, 
2018; Wang, 2013; Teigen, 2012; Franceshet, 2012; Caul, 2001; Clayton, 2018) there is just as 
many that are apprehensive towards them (Alstott, 2014; Rose, 2007; Grosvold, 2016; Smith, 
2018; Matsa, 2013). In the following section, I will discuss these competing findings in more 
detail. Ultimately corporate gender quotas, although good in theory, have numerous downsides 
for the United States. Legal challenges will present a formidable barrier and cultural norms may 
make the policy unlikely to pass. These challenges will unfortunately make gender quotas an 
unrealistic policy solution for many states and the federal government, despite California already 
passing their own quota.  
Impact of Gender Quotas 
Although riddled with impracticalities, gender quotas are arguably the fastest solution to 
increasing female representation. By mandating that a specific percentage of a board must be 
female, gender quotas can achieve fast success in increasing gender equity (Teigen, 2012; Smith, 
2018). However, this impact depends largely on how the quota is set up. Norway, for instance, 
imposes a harsh penalty for not complying with their quota by effectively shutting down firms 
that do not comply. This penalty increased female representation in Norway to the quota’s 
minimum of 40% in just one year after the law’s implementation (Teigen, 2012). Spain, in 
contrast, has weak penalties for not increasing gender representation and, as a result, little 
progress has been made (Terjesen, 2019). Quotas therefore can be useful in increasing female 
representation but are evidently limited by the policy that establishes them.  
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Once corporations achieve their intended target under quotas, numerous benefits arise 
from having gender equitable boards. One study examined Norway’s gender quota and found 
that it has a positive impact on the number of female board chairs and CEOs, indicating a spill-
over effect to other top leadership positions (Wang, 2013). Other studies on quotas agree with 
this effect, indicating the potential that female board members can have on inspiring and 
mentoring other women within the corporation (Smith, 2018). However, these impacts, while 
positive, are the same for any corporation with high female representation, irrespective if the 
gender equity was achieved through a quota or another means. Thus, it is the impact of female 
representation, rather than the quota itself, that provides benefits.  
Studies that look at the impact of gender quotas on profit are more skeptical of the 
benefits of quotas. While the studies on boards with high female representation generally 
indicate a positive impact on profit, the studies on quotas indicate otherwise. Some studies argue 
that you cannot justify gender quotas on the grounds of economic efficiency, claiming that 
evidence suggests neither a positive nor negative effect (Smith, 2018; Rose, 2007). However, 
Matsa disagrees and claims that based on her study of Norway, profits decrease after quotas are 
implemented. This is primarily because of increased labor costs from fewer layoffs and higher 
relative employment (Matsa, 2013). No study has found evidence that gender quotas increase 
firm profits in the short-term, which is problematic given that studies on female representation 
indicate otherwise, suggesting that there is something specifically about quotas that can 
negatively affect profit. 
Another critique against gender quotas is that they artificially create gender equity, 
resulting in undesirable consequences. Evidence shows that in countries that have gender quotas, 
the percentage of female board members has stagnated after it reached the mandated level. In 
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Norway, for instance, the mandate was 40% and over ten years after the law’s implementation, it 
has not increased beyond that (Seierstad, 2017). This shows that while quotas can increase 
female representation, they do not necessarily change how corporations appoint women beyond 
the mandate.  
Furthermore, some scholars worry that quotas may create a perception that unqualified 
women are joining boards (Smith, 2018; Terjesen, 2009). Studies on quotas show that some men 
view women as unqualified and less competent to hold leadership positions, especially given 
how male-dominated the business sector is (Terjesen, 2009). Some men fear that women 
inherently have opposing opinions, which is problematic for any policy that attempts to increase 
female representation. However, early results from California indicate that many of the new 
women joining boards are highly qualified. Nearly half (46%) of the women hold an executive 
level position, including CEO, CFO, and president (KPMG, 2020). Additionally, 76% hold an 
advanced degree, further indicating that the newly hired women are qualified and competent to 
serve as a director (KPMG, 2020).  
Feasibility of Quotas 
Although quotas are linked to both positive and negative impacts, arguably the biggest 
reason that they will not work is that they directly clash with American culture. Many people 
resent quotas, as they are a direct influence of the government into businesses practices. 
Unsurprisingly, a study by PwC found that 83% of board directors – including more than 50% of 
female directors – oppose laws, such as quotas, that mandate gender diversity (PwC Study, 
2019). American businesses idolize the free market and investor choice, meaning that businesses 
will be resistant to the state dictating the gender of their boards. Quotas therefore will “sit 
uneasily with deeply-held beliefs” about the role of government in regulating businesses (Alstott 
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2014, 45). American culture is heavily influenced by the laissez-faire movement, which is a 
significant difference from the European countries that have passed gender quotas. Given this 
strong resistance to government interference, gender quotas can easily create resentment and less 
effective leadership. Some men will inevitably wonder if the females on boards are there because 
of their merit or because of their gender.  This may cause men to question the legitimacy of 
female board members, potentially then causing women on boards to begin doubting their own 
self-worth. If such an environment of doubt and resentment is fostered, the effectiveness of 
female leadership is effectively undermined.  
Quotas can also undermine female leadership if they force social change before a country 
is ready for it. Though this does not necessarily apply to America, other countries have had to 
deal with the consequences of essentially taking shortcuts to boost female representation. In 
Rwanda, for instance, legislative quotas were passed in the aftermath of the Rwandan Genocide. 
Over half of the legislative seats in Rwanda are filled by women – the most of any country in the 
world – yet this is merely a “smoke screen” (Filipovic, 2019). Women largely cannot advocate 
for policies that go against the status quo, mainly because women are still massively oppressed in 
their home life. Men have complete authority over women in social matters, therefore 
undermining the impact of the quota. This indicates that for women’s empowerment to be 
meaningful and durable, it must be “coupled with strong [social movements]” (Filipovic, 2019). 
While the quotas in Rwanda were legislative rather than corporate, it is not a stretch to assume a 
similar effect happening with corporate quotas.  
Even if American culture was not an issue in passing gender quotas, it is largely unknown 
as to whether quotas are even legal. Nothing has been published that definitively says whether 
quotas are prohibited by the United States Constitution. Given this uncertainty, scholars estimate 
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that the Supreme Court will need to determine the constitutionality of quotas (Alstott, 2014). 
California’s passage of quotas and any potential lawsuits will therefore set a precedent for the 
remaining states. Former California Governor Jerry Brown even acknowledged the serious legal 
concerns when signing the law into place, admitting that the “flaws” may “prove fatal to its 
ultimate implementation” (Ortiz, 2018). Furthermore, the California Chamber of Commerce 
staunchly opposed the policy, arguing it lacked Constitutional backing. Despite these legal 
challenges, Governor Brown implied that the law was nevertheless critical to establishing a 
government that cares about women.  
At least two lawsuits have been filed regarding California’s quota. The first is filed by the 
Pacific Legal Foundation and argues that the law is discriminatory against men. The Foundation 
argues that the law violates the Constitution’s equal protection clause by forcing companies to 
“discriminate on the basis of sex” (Campbell, 2019). Additionally, the group contends that the 
law is condescending towards women, as quotas supposedly assume that women are not capable 
of getting board seats without the help of the government (Campbell, 2019). The argument 
clearly rests on the assumption that reverse discrimination exists and uses the argument to further 
what is undoubtedly a sexist view about the role of women in leadership. The second lawsuit is 
filed by Judicial Watch and argues that using the state’s money to enforce the law violates the 
California Constitution (Brown, 2019). Although the standing of these lawsuits is yet to be seen, 
they nevertheless present a challenge to the legality of quotas. Lawsuits can last for years, during 
which other states may become dissuaded about passing their own quota. Even if quotas are 
eventually deemed legal, the lengthy legal battle may not be worth it for other states.  
While gender quotas are arguably a fast and effective way to increase gender parity, they 
are not without their faults. Additionally, they are not a feasible policy solution for the United 
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States, given the legal and cultural limitations. Few alternative policy solutions have garnered 
attention, likely because the literature focuses too much on quotas to the detriment of other 
potential policies. The next chapter compiles a database on corporate practices to provide insight 




















 The infeasibility of gender quotas means that another policy is needed to achieve board 
gender parity. However, alternative policies are rarely assessed in the existing literature. To 
overcome this obstacle, I have compiled a database of 100 companies on the S&P 500. The 
database tracks the percentage of female directors and includes corporate practices and policies 
that are thought to influence gender diversity. The chapter ends with basic summary statistics of 
the variables in the database. Some variables, such as retirement ages and diversity policies, 
appear to not correlate with the number of female directors. However, many of the remaining 
variables do seem to have a correlation. This provides insight into the types of policies that will 
be most effective at increasing female representation on boards.  
Data Source 
There exists no public database about gender equity of corporate boards. A few studies 
on the topic, namely the studies sponsored by the Alliance for Board Diversity and Catalyst 
Institute, have made databases but only partially release the database to the public. Furthermore, 
these databases do not cover many of the important variables needed in my analysis, making 
them largely useless for this thesis. For instance, the database in Catalyst’s “Bottom Line Study” 
only includes the company’s industry and their gender diversity quartile, which is a ranking self-
imposed by Catalyst for the purpose of their study (The Bottom Line, 2004). As such, I have had 
to compile my own database, which is included in its entirely in Table A.3 in the Appendix.  
The first decision I made for this database regards the companies that are included. 
Several indexes exist that classify companies within the United States, such as the Fortune 500, 
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S&P 500, Dow Jones, and Russel 1000. Of these indexes, the Fortune 500 and the S&P 500 are 
the most widely known and often used in scholarly studies. The Fortune 500 is an annual list that 
ranks both publicly and privately held companies by their total revenue. In contrast, the S&P 500 
ranks the stock performance of the 500 largest publicly held corporations by market 
capitalization. Companies on both indexes are limited to corporations registered in the United 
States.  
I chose to use the S&P 500 because that index is limited to only publicly held 
corporations. Privately held corporations do not issue stock and thus are not required to release 
the financial assessment reports like the ones publicly held corporations release. This limits the 
amount of publicly known information on privately held corporations, making it difficult to 
include them in such a database. Another consideration on limiting the database to only publicly 
held corporations is the composition of the executive board. While every corporation-both public 
and private- is required to have a board with at least one director, public corporations typically 
hold their directors to much higher standards. This is because board members in public 
corporations are elected and held accountable by shareholders, whereas private companies 
answer only to themselves. Owners of a private company are free to pick their board members in 
any way they see fit, meaning that close friends and family are eligible for board positions. This 
influences the composition of private boards and makes analyzing these corporations impractical 
if they are compared to publicly held corporations. 
Publicly held companies are also listed on the stock market, indicating that these 
companies are sensitive to how the stock market reacts. The stock market reacts very fast, 
meaning that when a company faces a scandal their stock tends to drop almost immediately. This 
forces public companies to typically respond to scandals and try to fix them. Private companies, 
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however, feel no ill-effects from the stock market and therefore may be less likely to respond to a 
scandal. A study conducted on CEO scandals found that in the immediate aftermath of 
misconduct, share prices dropped by 3.1%. In over half of the scandals, the board of directors 
directly intervened to mitigate the public backlash (Larcker, 2016). They often opted to make 
changes to the board structure in response to such scandals (Larcker, 2016). The stock market 
therefore effectively holds publicly held corporations to a higher standard of governance, likely 
influencing board composition.  
California’s quota law also only affects publicly held companies, further making the S&P 
500 the best index to use for the database. California’s quota has no effect on privately held 
companies, meaning that these companies are not fined if they underrepresent women on their 
board of directors. While quotas may not yet be realistic for most American states, it is not 
implausible that a select number of progressive states will try to implement a quota within the 
next few years. As such, strictly choosing publicly held corporations for the database is the most 
sensible course of action.  
Compiling the Data 
 As implied in the name, the S&P 500 is a list of 500 large corporations listed on stock 
exchanges in the United States. Although analyzing all 500 companies is ideal, it was not 
feasible due to time restraints. The Wall Street Journal compiled a list in 2016 of all the S&P 500 
companies and ranked them by the percentage of women on their boards (Lightner et al., 2016). 
This list gave me an idea of how many women reside on most boards, but I ultimately could not 
use it given that the data was a few years out of date. For instance, in 2016, 11 of these 
companies included no female board members but as of July 2019 every company on the S&P 
500 has at least one woman on their board (Umoh, 2019). However, the list did identify three 
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companies where the board is comprised of over 50% women. These companies are Navient, 
Michael Kors, and Tegna. These three companies are included in the database to ensure that 
there are at least a few companies with extremely high female representation. An additional 97 
companies were picked using a random number generator from the January 2020 S&P 500 list. 
These companies are listed in Table 3.1. Given the large sample size (1/5 of the total), the sample 
is a good indicator of the entire S&P 500. While this sample does not represent every corporation 
within the United States, it is a good indicator of the actions of large, publicly held corporations.  
 All the data was found through company websites, particularly in the company’s 
governance guidelines. In cases where information was vague or unable to be found, this 
limitation is noted within the database. Most companies are extremely transparent with their 
board members and their board guidelines. However, parental leave policies and family-friendly 
policies are much harder to find and often are vaguely discussed on websites in their employee 
benefits section. This is undoubtedly the biggest limitation of the database and it is discussed in 
more detail later in this chapter.  
 In addition to the number of women on the board, several other variables are included in 
the database. First, I included the type of industry because existing studies have found a 
correlation between women in leadership positions and the industry. Notably, Catalyst’s “Bottom 
Line Study” uses industry as one of the few variables they track (The Bottom Line, 2004). The 
year the existing female board members joined is also included. This was added because 
numerous studies show that female board representation has experienced substantial increases 
within the last few years (Alliance for Board Diversity, 2018; Lee, 2015). By tracking the years 




Table 3.1: The 100 Companies in the Database 
 
 
Capri Walmart  Western Digital  PPL Corporation 
Navient ViacomCBS  Host Hotels & Resorts  Fastenal Company 
Tegna SL Green Realty  Carnival Corporation eBay  
Arista Networks  Ameren  CDW Corp. Merck & Co.  
Chipotle Hologic  American Electric Power   A. O. Smith Corporation 
Invesco Duke Realty  Xilinx Inc. Southern Company 
Zebra Technologies  Lockheed Martin  Atmos Energy Corporation Whirlpool Corporation 
O'Reilly Automotive  Waters Corporation Cincinnati Financial  Assurant  
Leidos Holdings  Citizens Financial Group  DaVita  Tractor Supply Company 
Amazon Facebook Inc. IPG Photonics Corporation Genuine Parts Company 
General Motors  Linde PLC LyondellBasell Industries  Intuitive Surgical  
Flowserve Corporation Illumina  Truist Financial  Hess Corporation 
Mid-America Apartment   Mondelez International  Tiffany & Co. Ingersoll-Rand  
Fifth Third Bancorp Freeport-McMoRan  HP Inc. International Paper  
General Mills NRG Energy  Varian Medical Systems  Xylem  
American Airlines PulteGroup  Accenture  EOG Resources  
Visa  Danaher Corporation W. R. Berkley  Monster Beverage  
DXC Technology  F5 Networks  Avery Dennison  Teleflex Incorporated 
Eversource Energy STERIS  Federal Realty Investment  Hilton 
Dish Network Exelon  Equinix  First Republic Bank 
D.R. Horton  Newmont  National Oilwell Varco  WEC Energy Group  
TJX Companies FleetCor Technologies  Duke Energy Corporation Norwegian Cruise Line  
Mohawk Industries  Henry Schein  Snap-on Incorporated Advanced Micro Devices  
Tapestry  Humana  Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. Xerox Holdings  
Ameriprise Financial  Campbell Soup Company Unum Group Royal Caribbean Cruises  
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 A few studies show a link between board policies and board composition (Yerger, 2015). 
Term limits and retirement policies ensure that new board members are chosen, which may 
contribute to more diverse boards. This makes sense logistically, given that it was previously 
established that boards are increasingly picking more diverse members. As such, both term limits 
and board retirement policies are included as variables in the database. Additionally, every board 
of directors releases a policy regarding what characteristics they look for in nominating and 
choosing new board members. Although board diversity policies are not the focus of any existing 
study, I felt that including this variable may shed some light as to whether having a specific 
board diversity policy is correlated with more diverse boards. 
 The remaining variables that I included are not explicitly related to a corporation’s board 
of directors.  However, these variables are either linked to high female representation in 
leadership or are thought to be a consequence of female leadership. The number of women in 
executive positions is included, foremost to contrast to the number of women on the board and to 
provide a basis for the remaining variables. The remaining variables are parental leave and other 
parental supportive policies. Parental leave and other child-friendly policies are typically used 
most widely by women and therefore benefit women the most. As such, these policies may be 
correlated to the number of women on corporate boards. It is impossible to tell with my data, 
however, if these policies cause more women to join boards or if the women on the boards 
implement these policies. Regardless, establishing any relationship between these policies and 
board composition is a significant finding in of itself.  
 Altogether, this database includes nine variables. The intention is to show whether any of 
these variables correlate with board gender diversity. Although causation cannot be 
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unequivocally demonstrated, the results from my analysis will help inform policies that can 
hopefully improve gender equity on corporate boards.  
Data Limitations 
Given time restrictions, there are several limitations within the database.  Ideally, all the 
companies of the S&P 500 would be included, rather than the randomly selected sample of 100 
companies. Furthermore, some of the concepts that I wanted to measure had to be modified. For 
instance, I wanted to track how long every board member served on their board, but this was 
eventually limited to just female board members. Modifications such as these are minor and do 
not substantially impact my analysis, especially when considered with the existing literature. 
Although numerous variables can be tracked regarding board composition and female 
oriented policies, my analysis will not be able to demonstrate a definitive causal relationship.  
For instance, parental leave policies and high female representative boards are correlated but I 
cannot definitively say that boards with more women are causing their companies to have better 
parental leave policies. In fact, the opposite may be true: companies with better parental leave 
policies may be the cause of their corporate boards including more women. While the direction 
of these relationships is unknown, it is nonetheless helpful to know that these correlations exist. 
Several of the variables I tracked are not included in any pre-existing study, making my study 
uniquely suited to help future researchers understand the relationship between board composition 
and corporate policies.  
Companies are constantly changing their boards, meaning my database will become 
increasingly out of date as time passes. This database was compiled in January 2020 and my 
analysis was completed in the spring of 2020. Nonetheless, some companies have already made 
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changes to their board in the interim. For instance, I identified that women compose 29% of the 
board at Facebook. However, in March 2020 the company added an additional two women to 
their board after garnering negative media attention for their board’s low level of gender parity 
(Price, 2020). As a result, women now compose 40% of their board, moving Facebook from the 
medium range of female representation into the high range. This change, however, is not 
reflected in the database. This data limitation, albeit frustrating, is a welcomed change given the 
increased number of women serving on boards.  
Female Leadership 
 Female representation on corporate boards has grown in the last few years, generating 
hope for gender equity. According to Catalyst, women held 24% of the S&P 500 Board seats in 
2018, an improvement from 2010 when women held only 12% (Catalyst, 2018). As of July 2019, 
every S&P 500 board contained at least one woman. While this is a seemingly low achievement, 
it is consequential when compared to 2009 when 56 S&P 500 boards included no women 
(Catalyst, 2018). These findings are important not only for gender equity but also for validating 
the findings of this analysis’s database. As of January 2020, S&P 500 boards contained roughly 
28% women. Of the companies included in my database, women held seats on every board.  
For the purpose of analyzing the data, the companies are broken up into three categories 
depending on the level of gender equity. Low female representative boards are classified as 
boards containing 19% or less female members. Medium female representative boards contain 
20-39% and high female representative boards are 40% and above. Figure 3.1 shows that almost 
75% of boards fall within the medium range. Of the remaining companies, 15% have low female 
representation and 11% have high female representation.  
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Executive positions are harder to quantify than board seats, given that every company has 
their own policy as to what qualifies as an executive. As listed on their company website, some 
companies, such as Capri, only have four executives whereas Mid-Atlantic Apartment 
Communities lists 34 executives. The term executive is often used interchangeably with high-
level management positions, making it hard to accurately quantify the number of executives each 
company has. In compiling the data, I deemed an executive as every person who was listed on a 
company’s top management team. This universally includes CEOs and often includes presidents 
of departments within the company. Although companies differ in how they classify an 
executive, it seems most relevant to quantify executives as the people that the company identifies 
as most important rather than using an arbitrary measurement for every company. Many existing 
studies focus exclusively on CEOs, which misses many other top-leadership positions within a 
company. As such, in the data, executives represent the most important leaders within each 
company according to each company’s website.  
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Female executives account for roughly 21% of all executives within a company. This 
number is noticeably lower than found on corporate boards, indicating that women are struggling 
more in executive positions relative to board positions. If the data was limited exclusively to 
CEOs, it is likely that number would be even lower. Catalyst found that in 2019 women account 
for only 6% of CEOs on S&P 500 boards (Catalyst, 2020). This number is especially troubling 
given that CEOs often serve on boards, both for the company they work for and for outside 
companies. According to a 2017 Spencer Stuart report, CEOs served on the board for the 
company they worked for 49% of the time. Additionally, 37% of CEOs serve on at least one 
board outside of their own company (Spencer Stuart, 2017). The lack of female CEOs therefore 
appears to aid in the underrepresentation of female board members.  
Female representation in executive positions correlates with female representation on 
boards. This is partially intuitive given that CEOs and other top executives frequently serve on 
boards. Figure 3.2 shows that among companies with high female representative boards, roughly 
29% of executives are females whereas for medium representative companies it is 20% and for 
low representative companies it is 16%. It is impossible to know whether the greater number of 
female representatives on certain boards are driving those companies to hire more females at 
executive-level positions or whether more female executives increase female board members. It 
could also be some third, confounding factor that causes a company to both hire more executive-
level women and have more women on their boards. Regardless of the direction of this 














Time on Board 
 Corporations currently seem motivated to increase the number of women on their boards.  
Whether this is due to a genuine desire to increase female representation or due to societal 
expectations is unknown. However, it is clear that boards are increasingly adding more women, 
as evidenced by a 2017 Spencer Stuart report which found that 36% of new board hires are 
women. This is almost 10 percentage points higher than the current percentage of women on 
boards, indicating a growth in women hires relative to that of the current board gender 
composition (Spencer Stuart, 2017). Given this recent growth in women board members, it is 
likely that many of the women currently serving on boards were hired within the last few years. 
In my database, the average year that women joined a S&P 500 board is 2013. This indicates that 
women have served on a board for about 7 years on average.3 Given time limitations I could not 
 
3 Board membership duration is found by using the average year women joined a board and subtracting it from the 






















Female Representation in Boards 
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Average Year Women Joined the Board 
track the average year that men joined the board. However, for comparative purposes, the 
Spencer Stuart report found that the average tenure of all directors was over 8 years, which 
would then indicate that the average year directors joined a board was 2012 (Spencer Stuart, 
2017). On average, women therefore joined boards more recently, thus serving fewer years. 
However, we should be cautious about our use of this data because averages are liable to be 
skewed by outliers. For instance, the average number of years served by each company’s longest 
serving female director is over 12 years, indicating the potentiality for outliers.  
 The relationship between the year that females joined a board and overall board gender 
composition is unknown. Companies with a long history of female board members may have a 
stronger commitment to gender parity than companies without a long history of women serving 
on their board. However, adding one woman to a board a long time ago does not guarantee that 
the company subsequently adds more women. Additionally, societal pressures have resulted in 
several companies recently adding more women to their boards, meaning that companies with 
high female representation may have only gained gender parity very recently. As a result, there is 
no discernable relationship between the average year that women joined boards and the overall 
gender parity of the board. This is depicted in Figure 3.3. 
























An arguably more revealing metric is the mode. In the data, 2019 is the year that the 
highest number of women joined an executive board. This confirms a previous hypothesis that 
many women currently serving on boards joined recently. The next year that the highest number 
of women joined a board was 2018 then followed by 2017, further indicating that female board 
membership is increasing every year. The years that women joined a board range from 1980 up 
to 2020, with considerably fewer women serving on boards in the 1980s and 1990s than today. 
However, this data does not include the women who have previously served on a board but have 
since retired. As a result, there are undoubtedly women that are unaccounted for in this data, 
given retirements. However, female board membership is undeniably increasing. In 2007, 
women filled only 19% of open boards seats that year, indicating almost a 20-percentage point 
increase in 10 years (Spencer Stuart, 2017). Given this increase, we can reasonably assume that 
the limitations in the data are not substantially impacting the analysis.  
Industry 
 While the number of women in leadership positions is increasing, this growth depends 
substantially on the type of industry. Evidence shows that women are more likely to progress in 
the education or retail industry than they are in technology or construction (McCarthy, 2016). 
This disproportionate growth in gender equity has drawn harsh criticisms, particularly for highly 
visible technology companies. Apple, for instance, has faced on-going criticisms for their lack of 
gender diversity, prompting the company to start releasing annual diversity reports in 2014. 
Their 2019 report reveals that only 29% of leaders are females yet this is depicted positively as it 
is an increase from previous years (Apple Diversity Report, 2019). A similar trend is seen among 
the other technology giants including Amazon, Google, and Facebook. All these companies 
proudly make the effort to advertise their gender diversity initiatives, which typically include 
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women councils and mentoring programs. These initiatives get a lot of attention from the public 
and are thus widely reported in the media.  
 While the trend for the technology industry to improve their diversity initiatives is 
beneficial, it speaks to a larger problem technology companies have with gender equity. The 
tendency for the technology industry to underrepresent women is inherently unjust and their 
improvements are arguably a result of public pressure rather than a commitment to eradicating 
gender discrimination. Male-dominated industries that are less publicized, such as the 
construction industry, have made few strides to improve gender diversity. The disparity among 
industries is therefore relevant and is in many cases not getting better. Given this relevance, 
industry is included as one of the variables in this analysis.  
 There are numerous ways to categorize industries within the United States. For 
simplicity, 10 types of industries were chosen for this analysis. Several of these industries can be 
expanded or compressed if desired. The industries are: finance, retail, real estate, technology, 
energy/mining, hospitality, manufacturing, media, construction, and health. The depth of what is 
included in each industry is detailed in Table A.2 in the Appendix. Figure 3.4 depicts the 
frequency of each industry in the data. As depicted in Figure 3.4, manufacturing and technology 
are represented the most, with 23% and 19% respectively. In contrast, construction only makes 















Figures 3.5 and 3.6 analyze industry type and female representation. Figure 3.5 and Table 
3.2 shows the percentage of companies within each industry for each level of female 
representation. As depicted in the graph, retail and media companies seem to correlate the most 
to high female representative companies. 36% of companies with high female representation are 
retail and 18% are media. In contrast, both these industries make up 0% of companies with low 
female representation. Figure 3.6 and Table 3.3 depict a similar but slightly different finding. In 
Figure 3.6, the total is the industry rather than the breakdown of companies by gender. Figure 3.6 
shows that 50% of both retail and media companies have high female representation. This 
finding is unsurprising, especially for retail companies. Retail companies are seen as “feminized” 
in the sense that their clientele is mostly women. In the database, retail companies with high 
female representation include TJX, the parent company for the fashion stores TJ Maxx, 
Marshalls, and Home Goods, as well as Capri, the parent company for fashion brands Michael 
Kors and Jimmy Choo. Both TJX and Capri are indicative of “feminized” companies and 




















fittingly have boards that respectively are 45% and 50% female. Media companies, though not 
traditionally feminine, are also more likely to have women on their board. This is likely because 
media companies are more likely to experience public backlash for having low gender parity 
than other industries. Media companies are inherently public which essentially forces these 
companies to add more women to their boards.  
Given that the “feminized” retail industry has high female board representation, it is 
fitting that the industries of technology, manufacturing, and construction have low female board 
representation. These industries are seen as more male dominated. Among companies with low 
female representation, 33% are classified as manufacturing companies and 27% are technology 
companies, which is shown in Figure 3.5. As indicated before, technology companies have long 
been associated with low female representation, validating this finding. Manufacturing is also 
unsurprising, given that the US Bureau of Labor Statistics finds that men make up 71% of 
manufacturing jobs (US Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2019). While only 7% of low female 
represented companies are construction, 50% of construction companies are low female 
represented companies. This finding is a result of only having two construction companies in the 


























Industry High Women Medium Women Low Women 
Finance  9.09% 16.22% 6.67% 
Retail  36.36% 5.41% 0.00% 
Real Estate 0.00% 5.41% 6.67% 
Technology 9.09% 18.92% 26.67% 
Energy and Mining  9.09% 14.86% 13.33% 
Hospitality  9.09% 5.41% 6.67% 
Manufacturing  9.09% 22.97% 33.33% 
Media  18.18% 2.70% 0.00% 
Construction 0.00% 1.35% 6.67% 
Health  0.00% 6.76% 0.00% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 







































Industry High Women Medium Women Low Women Total 
Finance  7% 86% 7% 100% 
Retail  50% 50% 0% 100% 
Real Estate 0% 80% 20% 100% 
Technology 5% 74% 21% 100% 
Energy and Mining  7% 79% 14% 100% 
Hospitality  17% 67% 17% 100% 
Manufacturing  4% 74% 22% 100% 
Media  50% 50% 0% 100% 
Construction 0% 50% 50% 100% 
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“Feminized” industries therefore appear more likely to have boards with high female 
representation whereas male dominated industries are more likely to have boards with the lowest 
female representation. Although this finding is unsurprising, it nonetheless exemplifies the role 
sexism plays in gender representation. Equitable female representation seems to be only 
acceptable in “feminized” industries, serving to further cement these industries as appropriate for 
females and therefore acceptable for female board members. This is a vicious cycle and can often 
restrict women to only a select number of industries. Expanding the industries in which females 
serve on boards could potentially fix the gender composition of certain industries. Female leaders 
serve as mentors for other women, inspiring women to take on leadership positions (Kurtulus, 
2011). If there are more female board members in the manufacturing industry, for instance, more 
women leaders may emerge within the entire industry. Additionally, there is evidence that 
women are more likely to hire other women. A survey conducted exclusively of female 
entrepreneurs found that their businesses have workforces that are 66% female, indicating that 
women disproportionately hire other women (Lenz et al., 2018). If enough women are hired in 
traditionally “masculine” industries, this will help undermine the gender stereotypes associated 
with industries and provide women with more career opportunities.  
Parental Leave Policies 
 Women primarily still do the brunt of child raising, which means that parental leave 
policies disproportionately impact women. According to the New America report, there is no 
gender difference in the need to take family leave and men are only slightly less likely than 
women to take leave (Lenhart, 2019). Yet when men do take leave, they take many fewer days 
off despite being more likely to hold high-paying jobs that offer paid leave. This disparity in 
leave usage is troublesome because a growing body of research argues that the gender pay gap in 
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America and in Europe is more accurately described as a childbearing pay gap. Essentially, these 
studies have found that women’s earnings experience a sharp decline after the birth of their first 
child while men’s earning do not experience any change (Kleven et al., 2018). As a result, 
women typically earn 20% less than men during their career (Kleven et al., 2018). However, 
women without children are largely unaffected, indicating that it is the act of having and raising 
a child that puts women at a career disadvantage rather than merely their gender. Men’s earnings 
appear unaffected whether they have a child or not.  
 Numerous studies indicate that paid parental leave helps lessen the childbearing pay gap. 
Despite leave duration increasing with paid parental leave, several studies find that labor force 
attachment increases (Baum, 2016; Rossin-Slater, 2011). Scholars argue that paid parental leave 
allows more mothers to remain employed throughout their pregnancy and, thus, increases job 
continuity for new mothers. This enables mothers to return to their previous job, decreasing the 
costs associated with finding new employment (Baum, 2016; Rossin-Slater, 2011). Short-term 
increases in work hours are also predicted for these mothers once they return to work. Rossin-
Slater predicts a 6 to 9% increase in work hours for 1 to 3 years after giving birth, while Baum 
predicts an increase of 2.8 hours per week for the first-year post-birth (Rossin-Slater, 2011; 
Baum, 2016).  
 Paid parental leave policies are therefore extremely beneficial to women as they reduce 
the unequal burden of child raising that many women face. Given that only seven states in 
America currently have a paid parental leave policy, the responsibility for these policies often 
falls on companies. As of March 2018, 16% of privately employed workers had access to paid 
parental leave through their employer (Donovan, 2019). The companies that offer paid parental 
leave are typically large and among the highest grossing companies within the United States. 
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Most, if not all, of S&P 500 companies offer some form of paid parental leave. These policies 
have become a norm for the biggest companies in the United States, largely due to the 
competitive advantage companies with paid parental leave policies get when they seek new 
workers. 
 While a few companies proudly boast of their parental leave policy, most do not make 
their policy public knowledge. Several companies will even say that they offer paid parental 
leave but will not publicly provide specifics regarding leave duration. This makes it hard, but not 
impossible, to analyze the parental leave policies of the S&P 500 companies. The best estimate is 
that every company within the S&P 500 offers some form of parental leave, even if it very 
limited and short in duration. Of the 100 companies analyzed, every company either listed 
parental leave as one of their employee benefits or a third-party website claimed they offered it. 
However, given that third-party websites cannot be verified for legitimacy, I have decided to 
exclude companies that do not list the specifics of their parental leave policy on their company 
website. These companies are listed as N/A in Figure 3.7 and unfortunately make up 65% of the 
companies in the database. The lack of knowledge on these companies’ parental leave policies is 
therefore a limitation of the data.  
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The remaining 35% of companies are almost evenly split in how generous of a parental 
leave policy they offer.4 These policies are separated into three categories: six weeks and below, 
seven to twelve weeks, and thirteen weeks and up. These ranges were chosen based on existing 
state policies. Among the few states that offer paid parental leave, six weeks is a popular policy 
duration and is offered in New Jersey and California.5  Twelve weeks is the longest duration 
offered by any of the states and is therefore chosen as the cap for the medium level of parental 
leave. I considered any policy above 12 weeks as the most generous, given that no state offers 
anything in this range. These categories reflect an American standard for paid parental leave, as 
international policies are typically much more generous in terms of leave duration. Additionally, 
every company that had public information on their parental leave policy offered 100% of the 
employee’s pay, which is a rarity among state policies. 
 
4 This data is limited to maternity leave policies. Several companies offer women a more generous policy than 
men, but paternity leave policies are not considered in the analysis for the purpose of simplicity.  




Figure 3.8 analyzes companies’ parental leave policies and the gender representation on 
their corporate board. Table A.4 in the Appendix provides a breakdown of which companies fall 
into each parental group category. Due to the limitations in the data, “NA” is the most popular 
category for parental leave policies regardless of the gender breakdown of the board. However, 
companies with low female representative boards are more likely to have policies without any 
publicly released info in comparison to medium and high representative companies. Among low 
female representative companies, “NA” policies constitute 80% of companies whereas among 
medium and high representative companies it is 62% and 64% respectively. Although it is 
impossible to know why this disparity exists, it may be that companies with low female 
representation offer less generous parental leave policies. Companies with less generous policies 
may be less likely to publicly release the specifics of their policy as they know it could 
discourage workers from applying.  
 Figure 3.8 also shows that companies with high female representation appear to have the 
most generous parental leave policies whereas companies with the lowest female board 
representation have the least generous policies. No company with high female representation 
offers a parental leave policy of less than 6 weeks, while on the opposite end, no company with 
low female representation offers a policy with more than 12 weeks. Companies with medium 
female representation fall between these extremes, further supporting the notion that female 
board representation and the generosity of parental leave policies are correlated.  
 The disproportionate impact of parental leave policies on women means that companies 
that offer generous policies are indicating their support for women in the workplace. Generous 
parental leave policies may encourage more women to apply to a company. This is especially 
critical for industries that traditionally have low female board representation, such as the 
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technology sector. Whether boards with more females offer better policies or better policies 
result in more female board members is unknown. However, there is a correlation between 
parental leave and female representation, making it likely that companies with better parental 
leave policies have a work environment that promotes women achievement and leadership. 
 
Figure 3.8: Parental Leave & Female Directors  
    
  





Parent Friendly Policies 
 In addition to parental leave, there are several other policies that alleviate the burden 
women face in raising children. Parent friendly policies ease this burden by allowing for 
employees to more easily balance work and family life. A popular employee benefit is childcare 
services. Companies typically offer this through discounts at local daycare centers or by having 
their own onsite daycare service. This eases the burden workers face in paying for childcare 
services and helps encourage workers, especially women, to return to the workforce after having 





















children. Another benefit some employers offer is flexible schedules. Flexible schedules allow 
for workers to schedule their work hours around their family. Companies that offer this benefit 
often allow for workers to periodically work from home. Flexible schedules similarly ease the 
burden of child raising and increase workforce retention rates for new parents, especially 
women.  
 Figure 3.9 indicates the frequency of parent friendly policies among the companies in the 
database. 55% of companies do not list any parent friendly policy on their website. This is 
separate from parental leave, meaning that a company may offer parental leave but nothing 
beyond that. For instance, 13% of companies that do not have offer parent friendly policies do 
offer paid parental leave of at least 7 weeks or more. However, in general, companies that offer 
more parental leave appear more likely to offer parent friendly policies as well. As depicted in 
Figure 3.10, the percentage of companies offering no parent friendly policy decreases as parental 
leave gets more generous. For instance, 60% of companies with a parental leave policy of 6 
weeks or below do not offer parent friendly policies as compared to only 18% of companies with 
a parental leave policy of at least 13 weeks.  
  Among the companies that offer a parent friendly policy, the majority offer childcare 
services and a small minority offer flexible work schedules. There is an additional 8% of 
companies that offer a parent friendly policy that is unique to either one company or to a small 
number of companies. These policies are listed under “other” in Figure 3.9 given their low 
frequency. Waters Corporation, for instance, offers information and referrals related to children 
and other family related needs. Whirlpool provides a service that allows mothers to ship 
breastmilk home while traveling for work. These policies are similarly beneficial to parents, 
particularly to mothers, but are less common, resulting in the “other” category. 
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 Figure 3.11 breaks down parent friendly policies by board representation. Companies 
with low female board representation are much more likely to have no parent friendly policy. 
80% of companies with low female board equity do not have a policy whereas among companies 
with high female board representation only 18% do not have a policy. High female 
representative companies correspondingly are more likely to offer both childcare services and 
flexible schedules. This indicates that companies with high gender equity on their boards are 
more receptive to parents’ needs. This disproportionately benefits women given that women still 
undertake the majority of child rearing.  
 In addition to benefitting women, parent friendly policies benefit both children and 
employers. Parent friendly policies typically allow for workers to spend more time with their 
children, allowing for parents and children to develop a deeper bond. Children that are given 
more attention are then more likely to be healthier and better educated (Samson, 2019). 
Additionally, these policies are linked to better workplace productivity, largely because workers 
are relieved of stress. Companies with parent friendly policies are also more likely to attract, 
motivate, and retain better employees, providing companies with incentives beyond that of 
gender to implement parent friendly policies (Samson, 2019).  






















Type of Parent Friendly Policy 
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Board Diversity Policy 
 While every company in the United States is required to have a board, there are no 
federal stipulations beyond that.6 As such, boards can consider anything they want when picking 
members. However, most boards do claim to consider diversity among the characteristics they 
consider in their hiring process. Of the companies in the database, 74% have some form of board 
diversity policy. While several of these companies claim to not have a formal diversity policy, 
they nevertheless list diversity as a characteristic they consider. This is done by companies such 
Western Digital, whose policy regarding diversity is stated below: 
Although the Board has not established specific diversity guidelines, the Governance 
Committee is committed to Board diversity and takes into account the personal 
characteristics, experience and skills of current and prospective directors, including 
gender, race and ethnicity, to ensure that a broad range of perspectives is represented on 
the Board to effectively perform its governance role and oversee the execution of the 
Company’s strategy (Western Digital, Corporate Governance Guidelines).  
 Western Digital’s policy is characteristic of many companies. By stating that their board 
does not have a diversity policy, the company theoretically excuses itself from hypocrisy if their 
board is not diverse.7 However, the company simultaneously claims a commitment to diversity, a 
stance which is politically popular, especially given the recent Me Too Movement. Although 
these companies claim to not have a board diversity policy, they are nevertheless included in the 
 
6 The only exception to this is California’s gender quota. As of 2020, no other state has passed a quota, though a 
few have considered the possibility.  
7 For reference, women make up 37.5% of Western Digital’s board. This means that the company falls within the 
medium range for board diversity.  
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database as having one, as the language used otherwise indicates that they maintain a 
commitment to hiring gender diverse board members.  
 Unlike the previous variables, there does not appear to be a strong correlation between 
gender diverse boards and board diversity policies. As seen in Figure 3.12, high female 
representative companies have a board diversity policy 91% of the time, as compared to medium 
and low diverse companies which have a policy in 70% and 80% of companies respectively.  
Although high female diverse companies have a higher frequency of board diversity policies, 
low diverse companies also have a high percentage, which is higher than that of medium diverse 
companies. As such, it appears that having a board diversity policy does not correlate to having a 
diverse board. These policies are therefore largely superficial and likely imposed by boards 
because they know it is the politically correct thing to do. Having a policy and following it are 
therefore two very different things.  
 


























Companies by their Category of Board Gender Diversity  
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Retirement Policies and Term Limits 
 As stated earlier, companies are increasingly hiring more women. As of 2017, 36% of 
new board hires were women (Spencer Stuart, 2017). This exceeds the 28% of females currently 
serving on boards. While this still is not ideal, new hires are increasingly more diverse and 
representative of the entire population. The gender disparity of boards is therefore largely a result 
of existing board members, who are overwhelmingly white men.  Board retirement policies and 
term limits effectively allow for companies to diversify their boards.  
As depicted in Figure 3.13, the majority (63%) of companies have either a mandatory 
retirement age and/or a term limit. Term limits are rare, with only 5% of companies having them. 
All five of the companies with term limits also simultaneously have a retirement age. Walmart is 
among the five companies with a term limit, ensuring that their independent directors do not 
serve more than 12 years on their board. Their rationale for term limits demonstrates their desire 
for diversity and is stated below:  
We believe our term limits for independent directors provide discipline around the 
director refreshment process. In turn, this process has resulted in a diverse and highly 
skilled Board with the right mix of perspectives, experiences, and tenures, which we 
believe provides a distinct advantage during this time of rapid change (Walmart, 2019 













 Retirement policies are much more common among corporations. 30% of companies 
make their directors retire before the age of 75 while 28% of corporations have a retirement age 
75 or older. Retirement policies range from age 65 (Southern Corporation) up to 78 (O’Reilly 
Automotive). Several companies allow limited exceptions for directors to serve after the 
retirement age. This practice is common and justified by companies, such as Visa, who explain 
that:   
[T]he Board may waive this requirement on the recommendation of the Nominating and 
Corporate Governance Committee if, in light of all of the circumstances, a director’s 
continued service is in the best interests of the Company and its stockholders (Visa, 
Corporate Governance Guidelines).  
 Younger retirement ages and term limits should in theory result in higher turnover rates 
for boards, allowing for diverse members to fill the vacant seats. Given that the average age of 
directors is 63 and many directors serve on boards for decades, retirement and term limit policies 


















Type of Mandatory Retirement 
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shows. As seen in Figure 3.14, boards with high female representation are substantially less 
likely than boards with lower female representation to have a retirement policy. When high 
female representative boards do have a retirement policy, it is almost never over the age of 75. A 
retirement policy of 75 or older may largely be ineffective given the increased likelihood that 
board members will retire anyway. Nevertheless, the tendency for boards with high female 
representation to lack retirement policies indicates that these policies are likely largely 
ineffective. On the other hand, term limits seem to potentially correlate with higher gender 
representation. 9% of boards with high gender equity have a term limit. By contrast, 5% of 
medium representative boards had term limits and not a single low representative board has one. 
Given that the average age of a new director is 57, board members who are not term limited can 
potentially serve for over two decades, depending on their company’s retirement policy (Spencer 
Stuart, 2017). Term limits, especially if kept low, can therefore be more effective in creating 
board turnover and, as a result, the opportunity to increase female representation on the board.  
 




























 While term limits may produce greater board diversity, they are a rarity among 
companies. Only 5% of the companies in the database have term limits, substantially lower than 
the 63% of companies with retirement policies. Many companies indicated the benefits of term 
limits but nevertheless decided to not impose them. As stated by General Motors: 
[T] term limits could help ensure that there are fresh ideas and viewpoints available to 
the Board, they hold the disadvantage of losing the contribution of directors who have 
been able to develop, over a period of time, increasing insight into the Company and its 
operations and, therefore, provide an increasing contribution to the Board over time. As 
an alternative to strict term limits, the Governance Committee considers each director’s 
individual performance and contributions annually (General Motor’s, Board Guidelines). 
 General Motor’s dismissive use of term limits is common among companies, indicating 
that companies may value dedication over diversity. Without term limits, however, diversity may 
never be given an opportunity on these boards.  
Data Summary 
 Compiling a database of S&P 500 boards allows for an assessment of corporate practices. 
By analyzing these practices, I can develop a sense of what policies will best increase female 
representation on boards. Retirement policies, for instance, do not seem like a strong contender 
based on the data, but policies focused on industry type may work. However, my analysis in this 
chapter includes only basic statistics and should be used primarily as a visual representation of 
the data. In the next chapter, I use this data in order to run several regressions, allowing for a 
more advanced analysis. The results from the next chapter will primarily influence my policy 





 Applying regressions to the data helps clarify the relationships between the variables in 
the database. I have three models, each with a different dependent variable. Model 1 shows the 
impact of numerous policies on the number of female directors. As predicted in the previous 
chapter, retirement policies and board diversity policies are not effective. However, the longevity 
of female board members, the number of female executives, and the type of industry all 
significantly impact the presence of women on a board. In Models 2 and 3 the dependent 
variables are parental leave and parent friendly policies, respectively. These models are almost 
entirely statistically insignificant, likely due to limitations in the database. Given data limitations, 
the results from Model 1 will primarily shape the policy suggestions in the next chapter.  
Variables 
This analysis has three regression models, each utilizing a different dependent variable. 
The dependent variables are the percentage of women on boards, parental leave policies, and 
parent friendly policies. There are several potential independent variables, including mandatory 
retirement polices, board diversity policies, the percentage of female executives, longevity of 
board membership, and the type of industry. A more detailed explanation of all the variables 
used in the regressions are listed below in Table 4.1. Table 4.2 summarizes the regression results 





Table 4.1: Variables Included in Regression Models 
Variable Name Description 
WomenOnBoard This is the percentage of women serving on a company’s board of 
directors. 
Executives  This is the percentage of women serving in executive roles within a 
company. An executive is defined as a person holding a top 
management position within a company, as indicated by company 
websites.  
ParentalLeave This is the number of weeks of parental leave offered to a 
company’s employees. Companies that do not explicitly reveal the 
specifics of their policy are excluded.   
MandatoryRetirement This is a dichotomous variable for whether a company’s board has a 
mandatory retirement policy.  
BoardDiversityPolicy This is a dichotomous variable for whether a company has a board 
diversity policy.  
ParentFriendlyPolicy This is a dichotomous variable for whether a company has parent 
friendly policies, excluding parental leave.  
AverageBoardLength This is the average number of years that female board members have 
served on a board. All female board members currently serving on a 
company’s board are included.  
LongestBoardLength This is amount of years that the longest serving female board 
member has served on that board. This only includes women 
currently serving, meaning that this variable does not necessarily 
capture how long females have been allowed to serve on each 
company’s board.  
WomenIndustry This is a dichotomous variable for whether a company is in a female 
dominated industry. Female dominated industries are retail, media, 
and hospitality. These industries were chosen based on the high 












Model 1: Women on Boards 
 The percentage of women serving on boards is an obvious choice to use as a dependent 
variable. Identifying the policies and practices that correlate to more women on boards is 
imperative to understanding how companies can increase female representation. Regression 
Model 1 is listed below and is an OLS regression. The dependent variable (Yi) is the percentage 
of women on executive boards and there are six independent variables. These variables are 
mandatory retirement policies, the percentage of female executives, board diversity policies, 
female dominated industries, the average number of years served by female board members, and 




 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Women on Board ------ 24.7 5.7* 
Executives 26.2** -10.8 4.1 
Mandatory Retirement -0.4 ------ ------ 
Board Diversity Policy 0.5 ------ ------ 
Women Industry 5.2* 3.8 -0.5 
Average Board Length -1.6** 0.5 -0.03 
Longest Board Length 0.9*** -0.5 -0.01 
    
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001    
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Regression Model 1: 
Yi = β0 + β1MandatoryRetirementi + β2Executivesi + β3BoardDiversityPolicyi + 
β4WomenIndustryi + β5AverageBoardLengthi + β6LongestBoardLengthi + εi  
 
 Many of the variables included in this regression were chosen because they are policies 
intentionally meant to achieve diverse boards. The remaining variables were chosen to reflect the 
impact of longevity and the effect of diversity in other top leadership positions. The results of 
Regression Model 1 are available in the Appendix.8 The number of female executives appear to 
have the biggest impact on the number of female directors. A 1% point increase in female 
executives results in a 26% point increase in the percentage of women serving on a board, 
holding all else constant. Increasing female representation in other leadership positions is 
therefore a priority for anyone wanting to increase female representation on boards. CEOs are 
particularly important, given that 49% of CEOs serve on their company’s board (Spencer Stuart, 
2017).   
 Certain industries also appear to correlate with more women on boards. As indicated in 
Table 4.1, female dominated industries are retail, media, and hospitality. These three industries 
have a statistically higher percentage of companies with high female representative boards and 
therefore are included in the variable “women industry”. These industries are also traditionally 
“feminized” in the sense that workers within these industries are more likely female. As 
indicated in the regression results, female industries lead to a 5% point increase in the percentage 
of women on their boards, holding all else constant.  Restructuring societal beliefs on industries 
 
8 All the coefficients are multiplied by 100 to accurately reflect totals. 
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and gender stereotypes therefore has the potential to reduce the gender disparity seen among 
different industries. 
Longevity regarding board membership also appears to impact the likelihood of female 
board membership. The variable “average board length” is the average number of years served 
by all females currently on a company’s board. Interestingly, the coefficient on this variable is 
negative, implying that as women serve on boards for more years, it becomes less likely for 
female board membership to increase. However, the coefficient is extremely small, meaning that 
as the number of years served on a board increases by one year, boards only experience a 1.6% 
decrease in the number of female board members, holding all else constant. As a result, while the 
variable is statistically significant, it is not of particular practical significance. Initially, I 
hypothesized that boards with a longer history of female members would have greater gender 
parity. However, this variable is flawed, potentially influencing the result. Measuring the average 
number of years served by current female board members misses the women who previously 
served on boards but have since stopped serving. Additionally, several companies with high 
gender parity only recently increased the number of women on their boards. For most companies, 
this increase was motivated in part from societal pressure. Tiffany & Co, for instance, received 
negative media coverage in 2017 for their low gender parity (BOF, 2017). In just three years, the 
company responded to their critics by having a board composed 50% of women. This cycle of 
increasing female representation is becoming increasingly common among companies with high 
media visibility, thereby influencing the impact of this variable. Length of time women have 
served on a board does not positively impact the percentage of the women on the board today 
largely because we have seen such recent increases in female representation on boards. 
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“Longest board length” is another variable measuring longevity. Unlike the previous 
variable, this variable only measures the longevity of the longest serving female board member.  
This variable is meant to capture how long women have served on a company’s board. However, 
the variable is flawed because it does not account for women who may have previously served 
on the board but have since retired or quit. Although similar to the previous variable, the 
coefficient on this variable is positive, albeit extremely small. This is likely because the variable 
is not influenced by recent changes in society which have more dramatically increased the 
percentage of women on boards. As the number of years served by a woman increases by one, 
female board presence increases by 0.9%, holding all else constant. While the size of the impact 
is small, this indicates that companies with a longer history of female board membership are 
more likely to have gender equitable boards.  
Mandatory retirement policies and board diversity policies are the only variables not 
statistically significant.9 This suggests that company policies intended to increase board diversity 
largely are not working. This finding is consistent with the summary statistics and may indicate 
that many boards are trying to appear diverse even though they do not invoke any change. Many 
companies therefore know that gender initiatives are appealing to costumers, thereby influencing 
companies to appear diverse even when they are not ready to diversify their board members.  
Model 2: Parental Leave 
I also use parental leave as a dependent variable in my analysis. I chose this variable in 
order to see how gender equitable policies and practices influence the generosity of a program 
primarily benefiting women. Regression Model 2 is listed below. The dependent variable (Yi) is 
 
9 In this analysis, statistical significance is defined as p<.05.  
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the number of weeks of parental leave. Given that a substantial number of companies do not 
explicitly reveal the number of weeks provided in their parental leave program, this variable is 
limited to only 35 companies. As a result, this regression model is limited by the number of 
observations available and we should be cautious about drawing strong inferences from this 
model. The independent variables are the percentage of women on boards, the percentage of 
executives, average board length, longest board length, and women industry. The independent 
variables were chosen because they have the potential to impact parental leave policies but are 
not explicitly related to board procedures. The results of Regression Model 2 are available in the 
Appendix. 
 
Regression Model 2: 
Yi = β0 + β1WomenOnBoardi + β2Executivesi + β3AverageBoardLengthi + 
β4LongestBoardLengthi + β5WomenIndustryi + εi  
 
 None of the coefficients on the independent variables are statistically significant. This is 
likely a result of the small sample size, which limits the inferences that can be made about this 
data. Although the regression does not produce statistically significant results, it is nevertheless 
likely that some of these variables do influence parental leave generosity. Boards with more 
women, for instance, may be more attune to the necessity of parental leave policies given that a 
larger proportion of their board likely relied on parental leave. In our results, we see this variable 
go in the hypothesized positive direction. This regression, however, cannot strongly demonstrate 
such a relationship given data limitations.  
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Model 3: Parent Friendly Policies 
 Parent friendly policies are the final dependent variable. Parent friendly policies are any 
policy that benefits parents, excluding parental leave. Although related, parental leave and parent 
friendly policies are different measurements. The dependent variable (P) is a dichotomous 
variable indicating the presence of a parent friendly policy. This variable is very expansive in the 
sense that there are several types of parent friendly policies, ranging from childcare services to 
flexible work schedules. Ranking these policies in terms of generosity is therefore impossible, 
meaning that this variable must be dichotomous. Although this means that the variable is less 
precise, it allows for the inclusion of the entire database. A larger sample size is beneficial as it 
may increase the statistical significance of the coefficients. The independent variables are the 
percentage of women on boards, the percentage of female executives, average board length, 
longest board length, and female dominated industry.  
 Parent friendly policies is a dichotomous variable, meaning that OLS regressions are not 
suitable. A logistic regression is used instead, allowing for an analysis of the relationship 
between the variables. Regression Model 3 is listed below and notably uses a different regression 
equation than the previous two OLS regressions.  
 





The results of Regression Model 3 are available in the Appendix. The only variable that 
is statistically significant is the percentage of women on boards. However, coefficients in logit 
regressions are not directly interpretable, meaning that the magnitude of the effect of this 
variable is not directly observable by looking at the size of the coefficients.10 Although the size 
of the effect is not available, the coefficient does indicate that the relationship between parent 
friendly policies and the presence of female board members is positive. This indicates that 
female board members may advocate for parent friendly policies. 
The percentage of female executives is another variable of interest. Although not 
technically significant at the traditionally used measure for significance, the variable is 
nevertheless interesting given its p-value nearly achieved statistical significance.11 The 
coefficient on executives is positive, indicating a positive relationship between executives and 
parent friendly policies. The remaining variables- average board length, longest board length, 
and women industry- all have negative coefficients but none of these variables are statistically 
significant, meaning that it is impossible to establish a directional relationship.  
Overall Impact 
Out of the three regression models, the first model is the most consequential for the 
purpose of this analysis. Regression Model 1 shows the impact of numerous policies and 
company practices on female board members. Policies purposely meant to increase female 
representation, such as mandatory retirements and board diversity policies, largely are not 
 
10 Calculating predicted probabilities are one way to discern the magnitude of the effect when using a logistic 
regression. In this case, the predicted probabilities showed that the percentage of women on boards had a very 
small effect on parent friendly policies. This relationship, although statistically significant, is likely very small. More 
data is needed to accurately predict the size of this change.   
11 The p-value for executives is 0.073.  
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effective. However, the longevity of female board members, the number of female executives, 
and the type of industry all significantly impact the presence of women on a company’s board. 
Regression Models 2 and 3 almost entirely lack statistical significance. However, these models 
largely suffer from limitations in the data and do not necessarily imply that parental leave and 
parent friendly policies are not dependent on board practices or gender distributions. However, 
given the data limitations, Regression Model 1 will largely shape the policy suggestions put 

















 Policy Suggestions 
 Gender quotas are an efficient way to achieve gender parity on boards, despite some 
critics warning of their impact. However, regardless of any benefits derived from quotas, 
political limitations make them largely unsuitable for the United States. Quotas are an expansive 
policy that directly forces corporations to change how they govern their business. This 
undermines the American ideal of a free market and will effectively prevent quotas from passing 
in most states (Alstott, 2014). Instead, policies that indirectly and incrementally increase gender 
equity are better suited for American government, as well as policy suggestions that are not 
necessarily mandates. This means that there will not be a single policy that increases gender 
parity but rather an amalgamation of several policies that will collectively help increase the 
presence of female directors. These policies are best categorized as either government mandated 
policies or corporate suggestions and are analyzed below.  
Government Policy Suggestions 
 Social change in America often occurs from private initiatives rather than public policy 
(Terjesen, 2009). Although passing policies can be challenging, once they are passed, they are 
typically effective in bringing about change. This is because policies can be structured in a way 
that punishes companies when they are not complying. There are several potential policies that 
the government can enact to increase the number of female directors. Although quotas are 
arguably not feasible, the government could pass paid parental leave, subsidize programs that 
encourage women to pursue different types of industries, and/or require companies to implement 
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a Rooney Rule. All these policies have already been effectively implemented in some capacity in 
America, indicating their feasibility.  
Parental Leave 
 Although parental leave is almost certainly linked to female directors, it is impossible to 
establish the directional relationship between the two variables. Female directors may advocate 
for parental leave policies or parental leave policies may help women advance to directorial 
positions. Regardless of this relationship, it is important to foster parental leave policies given 
the advantages they provide to many women. Numerous studies, for instance, find evidence that 
parental leave lessens the childbearing pay gap by increasing labor force attachment for new 
mothers (Baum, 2016; Rossin-Slater, 2011). This is advantageous for working mothers and 
reduces the hurtles that many women face in advancing in their career.  
Congress passed the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) in 1993, providing job-
protected leave for up to twelve weeks for a qualified family and medical reason. Pregnancy and 
the adoption of children qualifies under the FMLA. However, the act does not provide paid 
leave, meaning that many new families, especially mothers, face a financial burden when they 
have children. As of January 2020, seven states and the District of Columbia have passed paid 
leave policies to compensate new parents. Private companies can continue to offer their own 
version of paid leave if it is at least as generous as the public program. Although many, if not 
most, of the companies on the S&P 500 offer their own version of paid leave, it is nonetheless 
crucial for a federal policy to pass. Most companies do not have the financial capability that the 




America is the only developed nation without a federal parental leave policy. While 
parental leave was opposed by most Americans a few decades ago, public opinion has shifted, 
and the policy is now largely favored by most Americans. In 2016, the Pew Research Center 
found that 82% of Americans support paid maternity leave and 69% support paid paternity leave 
(Pew Research Center, 2016). States are increasingly passing paid leave policies, with five states 
passing a policy within the last five years. It is therefore becoming increasingly more likely that 
Congress will pass a federal policy, especially given that both Democrat and Republican 
lawmakers have proposed versions of the policy. President Trump has even expressed support 
for the policy, though his administration has taken no substantive steps to achieve this.  
Out of all the proposed policies, parental leave is arguably the most realistic for Congress 
to pass. This is because the policy has a lot of support, from both citizens and lawmakers across 
the aisle. Furthermore, seven states have already implemented the policy, which is typical in the 
American system. Federalism encourages states to pass and essentially test new policies before a 
federal policy is implemented. Given that states are increasingly realizing the benefits of a paid 
leave policy, it seems likely that Congress will pass their own version within the next few years.  
Rooney Rule 
A Rooney Rule would also increase gender parity and would not impose an overly strict 
requirement on companies. The Rooney Rule was originally made in response to the lack of 
diversity among NFL coaches and requires that a team interview at least one minority candidate 
for head managerial positions. If applied to corporate boards, a Rooney Rule would require that 
at least some women are considered in the hiring process of new board candidates. This is less 
formal than quotas and is therefore a more attractive policy for the government. Several 
companies have already implemented this rule, with a relatively high level of success.  
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 Amazon attracted attention for passing a Rooney Rule in 2018, joining the ranks of 
companies like Microsoft and Uber. Amazon was initially resistant to the rule, claiming that it 
would artificially create the appearance of diversity (Johnson, 2018). However, the Rooney Rule 
was eventually passed and in the two succeeding years women on Amazon’s board have 
increased from 30% to 50%. Other companies have experienced similar increases, including the 
NFL, which piloted the rule. Despite these successes, critics of the Rooney Rule claim that 
companies can easily evade the rule by conducting sham interviews. Even if this were true, the 
rule has additional advantages regardless of the chosen candidate. Underrepresented candidates, 
for instance, gain valuable interviewing skills that can potentially help them get on a different 
board (Van Der Zon, 2012). Additionally, the rule forces majority candidates to become more 
competitive, ensuring that even if a majority candidate is chosen, he was not necessarily able to 
rely solely on his name or connections (Van Der Zon, 2012).  
Although the Rooney Rule has successfully increased gender diversity on many boards, 
experts caution that the rule is more effective if it requires at least two women to be interviewed 
for every board seat. Traditionally, the rule only requires one woman, but experts feel that if only 
one woman is interviewed for a director position, she “stands out so much” that she has “no 
chance of being hired” (Johnson, 2018). If two or more women are interviewed, however, it is 
much more likely that a woman is hired for the position. This phenomenon is evident when 
examining black hires in the NFL. If only one black candidate it interviewed, the chances of 
hiring a black coach is 5%. However, if two black coaches are interviewed, the chances of hiring 
a black coach increases to 33%. This is a major difference and indicates that the Rooney Rule is 
most effective if it raises the minimum number of diverse candidates to at least two. Any policy 
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on a Rooney Rule should therefore require at least two women interviewed for every new 
directorial position.  
Subsidized Programs for Male-Dominated Industries  
 The last policy for the government to implement regards the subsidization of programs 
that encourage women to pursue traditionally “masculine” or male-dominated industries. The 
regression model found that there is a strong correlation between the type of industry and the 
number of female directors. “Feminine” industries- which are retail, media, and hospitality- are 
linked to boards with more female directors. However, nothing about these industries is 
inherently feminine nor is anything about masculine industries inherently masculine. Rather, 
societal stereotypes and gender norms are influencing men and women to choose different career 
paths. Changing the way society views industries may influence the gender composition of 
boards, therefore giving both genders an equal chance to gain board seats. 
 Technology is traditionally considered one of the most male-dominated industries and is 
therefore an excellent example to use. Women only make up 28% of the workforce in STEM 
careers. For major technology companies, such as Google and Apple, it drops to 23% (NSB, 
2018). It is therefore unsurprising that the technology sector lacks female leaders, given that their 
candidacy pool for women is so small. Popular media often represents this gap to the public as 
the result of women being less suited for a career in the STEM field than men. However, 
numerous studies indicate that biological differences do not account for the gender disparity (Hill 
et al, 2010). Rather, women face a negative stereotype regarding their ability in math and 
science, which is shown to considerably lower their performance when they are young. This 
mindset then discourages girls from pursing a STEM career, resulting in so few women in the 
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technology sector. However, when girls are encouraged to pursue STEM, studies indicate that 
they are just as successful as men. 
 Programs that encourage girls to pursue STEM careers are therefore crucial to breaking 
down the industry’s gender disparity. Girls in Tech and Women Who Code are two of the several 
programs that nationally encourage women to purse and subsequently excel in the STEM field. If 
these programs were expanded, the gender stereotype surrounding the technology industry would 
eventually disappear and more women would subsequently rise to leadership roles within the 
industry. Similar programs should be implemented for every male-dominated industry, including 
construction, finance, and energy. The government should therefore subsidize these programs, 
thereby showing a commitment to reducing the gender disparity of boards. 
Tax Incentives  
 Compared to quotas, the aforementioned policies are less restrictive to the American 
ideal of a free market. Although this makes them more likely to pass, it does not guarantee their 
implementation. However, if designed with sensitivity to American institutions, the policies may 
pass comfortably. Tax incentives are used cleverly in the United States to pass social policies 
without appearing to infringe on the free market. For policies that have a hard time passing, tax 
incentives may be a better avenue to pursue instead of the traditional policy path. 
 Most Americans operate under the assumption that the market is better than the 
government for structuring businesses. This has halted the creation of policies that overtly 
regulate the business sector, such as corporate quotas. However, the United States still regulates 
businesses but does so discretely using the tax system. Tax incentives and penalties are used 
extensively in the United States because they “preserve the appearance of voluntarism” (Alstott, 
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2014). Technically, taxes do not force companies to act in a certain way. They only provide 
monetary incentives, which are largely effective in shaping the decisions of businesses.  
Although in practice taxes regulate businesses, they largely are not opposed. This is 
because tax law is so technical that most citizens are unaware that the government uses taxes to 
achieve policy objectives. For instance, the federal government provides tax incentives to 
companies that use alternative fuels and solar polar to improve global warming (Alstott, 2014). 
The government has also punished corporate decisions that they deem harmful, such as illegal 
bribes and kickbacks. Although most Americans are ignorant of business-focused tax incentives, 
the business sector is acutely aware and responsive to changes in the tax law. Most businesses 
optimize on tax incentives, making these incentives largely successful in shaping business 
decisions.  
If any of the previously mentioned policies face resistance, tax incentives are therefore a 
viable path forward. Firms cannot avoid paying federal taxes. Furthermore, federal taxes apply to 
the entire country, meaning that companies cannot move to a different state to avoid paying 
them. However, there is a large variation in the technicalities regarding tax incentives, just as 
there is a large variation in the number of policy objectives that the government can aim to 
achieve. Regardless of these variations, tax incentives allow for the government to achieve their 
policy goals without facing the traditional policy resistance. 
Corporate Policy Suggestions  
 Although the government can ensure the enforcement of policies through strict penalties 
or monetary incentives, some policies are not always feasible for the government to pass. Several 
policies are best left as suggestions given their novelty or their structure. These policies are less 
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desired since they are not enforceable but nevertheless represent ways for corporations to 
increase gender parity in the interim. These suggestions include mentoring programs, term limits, 
and informal quotas.   
Mentoring Programs 
 Mentoring programs are among the most visible programs that companies use to expand 
female leadership. These programs are essential because it is hard to increase female leadership 
at the top without creating programs that support women throughout their career journey. 
However, it is not entirely certain if female leaders in non-directorial positions increase the 
presence of female directors or if the direction is in the opposite way. Likely, however, the 
relationship is multi-directional. For instance, more female executives likely increase the number 
of female directors which in turn increases the number of female executives. Regression Model 1 
indicates that female executives and female directors correlate, meaning programs that encourage 
female executives warrant merit.  
Mentoring programs are used widely among companies to increase female leadership. 
However, these programs are highly specific to each company, meaning that it is hard to impose 
a federal policy that works for every corporation. Nevertheless, corporate-initiated programs are 
shown to successfully increase female leadership by exposing women at low-levels positions to 
women at high-level positions. This is beneficial because the existing underrepresentation of 
women in leadership positions sustains the perception that attaining leadership is hard for 
women. This creates a mental barrier for women and creates disincentives for many women from 
trying to advance in their career. However, this barrier is broken when women are exposed to 
other women who have attained top leadership roles. The lower-level women become “inspired” 
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by the “huge milestones” taken by the women at the top, enabling these women to visualize their 
own success (Terjesen, 2009).  
Unsurprisingly, numerous studies indicate that exposure to top female leaders is shown to 
have a positive influence on expanding the representation of women in leadership positions 
(Kurtulus, 2011; Wang, 2013). In addition to destigmatizing female leadership, mentoring 
programs achieve success by giving women exposure to networking opportunities. Access to 
top-ranking executives is a major benefit to anyone wanting to advance in their career. 
Relationships formed through mentoring programs therefore expose women to the potential for 
career advancements.  
 Companies should therefore form mentoring programs to expand the potential for female 
leaders. To achieve success, companies should allocate the proper resources and funding to 
women-specific mentoring programs. In addition to fostering relationships between women, the 
programs also should host events and workshops to help women gain the leadership skills 
necessary to advance in their careers. Any company that wants to increase the gender diversity of 
their leaders should seriously consider implementing a mentoring program.  
Term Limits and Retirement Policies 
Many companies implement retirement policies and term limits, but their effectiveness is 
disputed. These policies are meant to reduce the amount of time that directors serve on a board, 
thereby reducing the number of white men that traditionally occupy board seats. In theory, this 
opens the potential to hire new and diverse directors. However, these policies are not associated 
with gender equitable boards. The results from Regression Model 1 reveal that the presence of a 
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retirement policy is not linked in any meaningful way to the presence of female directors. There 
was not enough data on term limits to establish a link.  
Retirement policies are therefore not an effective policy solution. However, this may be 
because of the way the policy is set up. Among companies with a retirement policy, 51% require 
directors to retire before the age of 75, while 49% have a retirement age of 75 or older. The 
average retirement age is 73, which is considerably older than Social Security’s retirement age of 
66. Many companies even allow for directors to serve beyond the retirement age under special 
circumstances. Given that the average age of a new director is 55 (Spencer Stuart, 2017), it is 
plausible that many directors serve over 20 years on a board. This effectively negates the purpose 
of retirement policies, which is to limit the number of years that directors serve.  
Unlike retirement policies, term limits may effectively reduce the number of years that 
directors serve. This is because companies can ensure that directors only serve on a board for a 
short time by implementing a term limit of only a few years. Properly used term limits are 
therefore much more effective than retirement policies at increasing turnover. This may increase 
the chances for new and diverse directors to join boards, potentially increasing the gender parity 
of the boards. However, given that only 5% of the companies in the database require term limits, 
it is impossible to establish any directional link through regressions. However, term limits are 
still a notable policy given that of the few companies to require term limits, none of these 
companies had boards with low-female representation. This is especially notable, given that most 
of the term limits were in the range of 12 to 15 years. Although 12 to 15 years is lower than the 
estimated 20 years served by directors in companies without term limits, it is still a long time for 
any single director to serve. Therefore, term limits may become even more effective at increasing 
81 
 
gender parity if they were lowered to 5 to 8 years. This would effectively drive up the turnover 
rate of boards, thereby increasing the chances boards have to add women.  
Informal Quotas 
 For companies that are serious about adding women to their boards, quotas are still the 
most effective policy solution. Although quotas are largely infeasible on a state-wide or federal 
level, nothing prevents companies from implementing their own quota. This is arguably the best 
way for companies to signal their commitment to gender parity. Corporate-initiated quotas are 
therefore a policy recommendation but should not be enforced through any legal means.  
 Many companies currently signal their commitment to gender parity through diversity 
statements related to their board. Most companies (74%) have some form of diversity statement, 
which typically indicates that they consider gender as a favorable characteristic when they hire 
new board members. However, diversity statements are largely ineffective as indicated in 
Regression Model 1. There is no link between diversity statements and female directors, 
indicating that these statements are overly vague and lack the enforcement required to 
substantially increase female directors. Quotas, however, are specific commitments that 
corporations make, ensuring that gender parity is achieved. Although company quotas are 
entirely feasible, none of the corporations in the database have implemented them. Companies 
therefore still appear resistant to formal diversity requirements, even if they are the ones to 
impose them. This indicates that formal policies are still the most effective.  
Political Activism  
 Although policy recommendations and corporate suggestions are a formal avenue of 
eliciting change, sometimes the problem is best solved outside of the policy sphere. While the 
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aforementioned policies will increase gender parity, they will do so incrementally. Arguably a 
faster way to provoke change is through political activism. However, this does not mean that 
policies are useless or that nothing should be done about increasing gender parity. Rather, 
political activism should be used in conjunction with the policies to bring about change even 
faster. 
Political activism is a conscious effort to promote change regarding a specific problem in 
society. Political activism can take many forms and includes activities such a protests and letter 
campaigns. When these activities are done in a productive manner, it can increase media 
attention and hopefully shame companies into changing their board composition. The Me Too 
Movement is an example of political activism that has specifically brought attention to women’s 
rights. As a result, several companies have received negative media attention in the last few 
years regarding the gender composition of their boards. Facebook and Amazon are two of the 
most prominent companies to have received this negative attention, resulting in both companies 
adding more female directors.12  
The entire purpose of political activism is to shame companies into changing. Gender 
equality is a popular position in society, with most (59%) Americans feeling that there are not 
enough women in top executive business positions (Horowitz, 2018). When gender board 
disparities are exposed, consumers therefore become angry, potentially impacting the revenue of 
the company. To mitigate the negative backlash, companies are motivated to quickly add more 
female directors, as was done in Facebook and Amazon.  
 
12 In March 2020, Facebook doubled the number of women on their board in response to negative media 




Political activism therefore has the potential to bring about fast change, though policies 
are still needed to ensure that the change is sustainable. The changes that occur from political 
activism happen fast but do not necessarily mean that the company is committed to gender 
equality. Rather, the company is overly concerned with their profit and image, resulting in more 
female directors. The policies previously mentioned are slower and more deliberate, meaning 
that they help change the culture around gender and board composition. As such, political 
activism is helpful in the short-term for increasing gender equity but should be used in 
conjunction with policies to ensure a lasting increase in gender equitable boards.  
Policy Summary 
 Given the infeasibility of gender quotas, alterative policies are needed. Policies that 
indirectly increase gender equity are better suited for American politics as well as policy 
suggestions that are not mandates. The government should initiate parental leave, a Rooney Rule, 
and subsidize programs for male-dominated industries. If these policies face resistance, the 
government could implement them through the form of tax incentives. Policies that will face the 
most opposition but are nevertheless beneficial are mentoring programs, term limits, and 
informal quotas. These policies are suggested for companies that want to independently achieve 
gender parity at a fast rate.  
Although the policies I have suggested are arguably less efficient than gender quotas, 
most of them are feasible in the context of American politics. It is better to have a policy that is 
less efficient but is feasible rather than have no policy at all. Gender quotas may still be the goal 





 American society has largely grown to favor gender equitable boards, yet most 
companies do not make it a priority. This has resulted in the slow growth of female directors, 
making it essential for the government to enact a policy. Corporate quotas are used abroad and in 
California, but political limitations make them likely infeasible for the majority of America. Few 
other policies garner much consideration. This thesis focused on alternative policies and 
compiled a unique database to assess the options. A mix of policies that indirectly increase 
gender parity are found to be better suited for American government. Parental leave, a Rooney 
Rule, and subsidized programs for male-dominated industries are policies with increasing 
popularity that are linked to the increase of female directors. These policies will face less 
resistance than quotas because they allow the business sector to preserve the appearance of free 
choice. They will increase gender parity, albeit at a slower rate than quotas. However, given that 
quotas are not realistic, the government should focus on passing policies that are less effective 
but more feasible. 
 Although quotas are not a suitable government policy, companies that are committed to 
increasing gender parity could still implement their own version of a quota. Term limits and 
mentoring programs are also alternative policies that companies can privately implement. These 
policies are less restrictive than quotas but arguably too restrictive for the government to pass. 
However, bypassing traditional policies may prove to be the most effective solution. Tax 
incentives cleverly allow for the government to achieve their policy aims while preserving the 
appearance of voluntarism. Political activism should also be used in conjunction with any of the 
proposed policy solutions, as it brings about public awareness of the issue.  
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 Future research should also focus on alternative types of diversity. Racial minorities, 
veterans, the disabled, and members of the LGBTQ community face similar obstacles in 
achieving representation. For instance, in 2018, racial minorities- both men and women- made up 
only 16% of board seats on Fortune 500 companies (Alliance for Board Diversity, 2018). For 
comparison, women made up 23%. Additionally, future research should utilize a larger database 
and include more variables, both of which I was not able to do because of time restraints. For 
instance, I would have preferred to include every company in the S&P 500 and as well as include 
variables that tracked men for comparative purposes. 
 Achieving gender parity on boards is a seemingly straightforward goal but has complex 
solutions. There is not a single policy that is both entirely effective and feasible. However, 
instituting a mix of the proposed policies will encourage boards to add more female directors. 
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13 A more detailed database is available upon request. 
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Table A.4: Companies Classified by their Parental Leave Policy 
N/A Policy 6 Weeks & Below 7-12 Weeks 13 Weeks & Up 
Capri Zebra Technologies  Tegna Invesco 
Navient Walmart Fifth Third Bank Amazon 






Waters Corporation Danaher Corporation Hologic 
Leidos Holdings Inc. Xylem Inc. F5 Networks Inc. Facebook 
General Motors EOG Resources 
Inc. 
Teleflex Incorporated FleetCor Technologies Inc. 
Flowserve  DaVita Inc. Hilton Worldwide 
Holdings Inc 
Humana Inc. 
DXC Technology Co. Unum Group First Republic Bank Exelon Corporation 





Tiffany & Co. 


















   
ViacomCBS Inc.  












   
Duke Realty 
Corporation 
   
93 
 
N/A Policy N/A Policy N/A Policy N/A Policy 
Lockheed Martin 
Corporation 













IPG Photonics Corporation 





PulteGroup Inc. CDW Corp. National Oilwell 
Varco Inc. 
HP Inc. 
Citizens Financial American Electric 
Power Company 
Inc. 
Merck & Co. Inc. Varian Medical Systems 
Inc. 
Linde Xilinx Inc. A. O. Smith 
Corporation 
Advanced Micro Devices 
Inc. 
STERIS Plc Atmos Energy 
Corporation 
Snap-on Incorporated Xerox Holdings 
Corporation 









PPL Corporation SL Green Realty Corp. 







Table A.4: Continued 
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Table A.5: Regression Model 1 (Yi = Women on Boards) 
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